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Perception is influenced both by the immediate pattern of sensory inputs and by memories acquired through
prior experiences with the world. Throughout much of its illustrious history, however, study of the cellular
basis of perception has focused on neuronal structures and events that underlie the detection and discrim-
ination of sensory stimuli. Relatively little attention has been paid to the means by which memories interact
with incoming sensory signals. Building upon recent neurophysiological/behavioral studies of the cortical
substrates of visual associative memory, I propose a specific functional process by which stored information
about the world supplements sensory inputs to yield neuronal signals that can account for visual perceptual
experience. This perspective represents a significant shift in the way we think about the cellular bases of
perception.You cannot count the number of bats in an inkblot
because there are none. And yet a man—if he be ‘‘bat-
minded’’—may ‘‘see’’ several. (Gregory Bateson, 1972)
It should come as no surprise that what you see is not deter-
mined solely by the patterns of light that fall upon your retinae.
Indeed, that visual perception is more than meets the eye has
been understood for centuries, and there are several extraretinal
factors known to interact with the incoming sensory data to yield
perceptual experience. Perhaps foremost among these factors
is information learned from our prior encounters with the visual
world—our memories—which enables us to infer the cause,
category, meaning, utility, and value of retinal images. By this
process, the inherent ambiguity and incompleteness of informa-
tion in the image—what is out there? Have I seen it before? What
does it mean? How is it used?—is overcome, nearly instanta-
neously and generally without awareness, to yield unequivocal
and behaviorally informative percepts.
How does this transformation occur, and what are the under-
lying neuronal structures and events? Viewed in the context of
a hierarchy of visual processing stages, prior knowledge of the
world is believed to be manifested as ‘‘top-down’’ neuronal
signals that influence the processing of ‘‘bottom-up’’ sensory
information arising from the retina. Although the primate visual
system has been a subject of intense study in neurobiological
experiments for a half-century now, the primary focus of this
research has been on the processing of visual signals as they
ascend bottom-up through various levels of the hierarchy.
Thus, with the notable exception of work on visual attention
(for review, see Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004), the neuronal
substrates of top-down influences on visual processing have
only recently come under investigation. Several of these recent
experiments specifically address the interactions between top-
down signals that reflect visual memories and bottom-up signals
that convey retinal image content. The results of these experi-ments call for a significant shift in the way we think about the
neuronal processing of visual information, and they are the
subject of this review.
The first part of this review explores neuronal changes that
parallel the acquisition of long-term memories of associations
between visual stimuli, such as between a knife and fork or a train
and its track. The second part considers neuronal events that
correspond to memories recalled via such learned associations
and the relationship of this recall to the phenomenon of visual
imagery. Finally, evidence is presented for a specific functional
process by which—in the prescient words of 19th century
perceptual psychologist James Sully (1888)—the mind ‘‘supple-
ments a sense impression by an accompaniment or escort of
revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived
sensations being solidified or ‘integrated’ into the form of a
percept.’’Visual Associative Learning and Memory
The concept of association is fundamental to learning and
memory. Although this point was appreciated by the Ancient
Greeks, it was by way of John Locke (1690) and the emergent
Associationist philosophy that the content of the human mind
became viewed as progressively accumulating and diversifying
throughout one’s lifetime via the ‘‘associations of ideas.’’ Locke
defined ‘‘ideas’’ broadly, but the simplest form of idea consists of
sensation itself. Indeed, the learning of associations between
sensory stimuli is a pervasive feature of human cognition.
Formally speaking, learned associations between sensory
stimuli constitute acquired information about statistical regulari-
ties in the observer’s environment, which may be highly benefi-
cial for predicting and interpreting future sensory inputs. Learned
associations also help define the semantic properties of stimuli,
as the meaning of a stimulus can be found, in large part, in the
other stimuli with which it is associated.Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 227
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Figure 1. Schematic Depiction of Change in Local Cortical
Connectivity and Neuronal Signaling Predicted to Underlie
Acquisition of Visual Associative Memories
(A) Nervous system consists of two parallel information processing channels,
which independently detect and represent visual stimuli ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B.’’ The flow
of information is largely feed-forward from the sensory periphery, but there
exist weak lateral connections that provide the potential for crosstalk between
channels. The stimulus selectivity of each channel can be revealed by moni-
toring neuronal responses in visual cortex. (Small plots at left indicate spike
rate as function of time.) The cortical neuron in the A channel responds strongly
to stimulus A and weakly or not at all to stimulus B. The B channel neuron does
the converse (not shown).
(B) Subject learns association between stimuli A and B by repeated temporal
pairing with reinforcement. Following sufficient training, the sight of one
stimulus comes to elicit pictorial recall of its pair.
(C) Associative learning is believed to be mediated by the strengthening of
connections—the lateral projections in this schematic—between the inde-
pendent representations of the paired stimuli. Each channel now receives
inputs from both stimuli, though via different routes. The neurophysiological
signature of this anatomical change is thus a convergence of responses to the
paired stimuli. This signature has been observed for neurons in the inferior
temporal (IT) cortex of rhesus monkeys (Sakai and Miyashita, 1991; Messinger
et al., 2001).
Neuron
PerspectiveAssociative learning can take place with or without an
observer’s awareness. It may be the product of simple temporal
coincidence of stimuli—your grandmother (stimulus 1) is
always seated in her favorite chair (stimulus 2)—or it may be
facilitated by conditional reinforcement—emotional rewards
may strengthen, for example, an association between the face228 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.of your lover (stimulus 1) and the song that the jukebox played
on your first date (stimulus 2).
A Neuronal Foundation for Associative Learning
The neuronal bases of associative learning have been the
subject of speculations and detailed theoretical accounts for
well over 100 years. Many of these proposals have at their
core an idea first advanced concretely by William James
(1890): the behavioral learning of an association between two
stimuli is accomplished by the establishment or strengthening
of a functional connection between the neuronal representations
of the associated stimuli.
At some level, James’ hypothesis must be correct, and it is
useful to consider the implications of this idea for the neuronal
representation of visual information. This can be done using
a simple example based on a nervous system composed of
two parallel visual information processing channels (Figure 1A).
These channels extend from the retina up through visual cortex
and beyond. One channel is dedicated to the processing of
stimulus A and the other stimulus B. The flow of information
through these channels is largely feed-forward, but there exist
weak lateral connections that provide limited opportunities for
crosstalk between the two channels. Recordings of activity
from the A neuron in visual cortex should reveal a high degree
of selectivity for stimulus A, relative to B, simply attributable to
the different routes by which the signals reach the recorded
neuron.
Now, suppose the subject in whose brain these two chan-
nels exist is trained to associate stimuli A and B, by repeated
temporal pairing of the stimuli in the presence of reinforcement
(Figure 1B). By the end of training, stimuli A and B are highly
predictive of one another—in some sense A means B, and
vice versa. The Jamesian hypothesis predicts that the neuronal
correlate of this associative learning is the strengthening
of crosstalk between the two channels (Figure 1C). Now
recordings from the A neuron should reveal similar responses
to stimuli A and B, because both channels now have compa-
rable access (albeit via different routes) to the recorded
neuron. Thus, according to this simple model, the predicted
neuronal signature of associative learning in visual cortex is
a convergence of response magnitudes—as A and B beco-
me associated, neurons initially responding selectively to one
or the other of these stimuli will generalize to the associated
stimulus.
Neural Correlates of Visual Associative Learning
An explicit test of the Jamesian hypothesis was first conducted
by Miyashita and colleagues (Sakai and Miyashita, 1991). These
investigators trained monkeys to associate a large number
of pairs of visual stimuli: A with B, C with D, etc. Following
behavioral acquisition of the associations, recordings were
made from isolated neurons in the inferior temporal (IT) cortex
(Figure 2), a region known to be critical for visual object recogni-
tion and memory (see below). Sakai and Miyashita (1991) found
that paired stimuli (e.g., A&B) elicited responses of similarmagni-
tude, whereas stimuli that were not paired (e.g., A&C) elicited
uncorrelated responses. This finding of ‘‘pair-coding’’ neurons
provided seminal support for the Jamesian view, as the similar
Figure 2. Locations and Connectivity of
Cerebral Cortical Areas of Rhesus Monkey
(Macaca mulatta) Involved in Associative
Memory, Visual Imagery, and Visual
Perception
(A) Lateral view of cortex. Superior temporal
sulcus (STS) is partially unfolded to show relevant
cortical areas that lie within. Distinctly colored
regions identify a subset (visual areas V1, V2, V4,
V4t, MT, MST, FST TEO, IT) of the nearly three
dozen cortical areas involved in the processing of
visual information.
(B) Ventral view of cortex. Distinctly colored
regions identify inferior temporal cortex (IT) and
a collection of medial temporal lobe (MTL) areas
critical for learning and memory (ER, entorhinal
cortex; PH, parahippocampal cortex; PR, peri-
rhinal cortex; H, hippocampal formation, lies in the
interior of the temporal lobe).
(C) Connectivity diagram illustrating known
anatomical projections from primary visual cortex
(V1) up through the inferior temporal (IT) cortex
and on to MTL areas. Most projections are
bidirectional.
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Perspectiveresponses to paired stimuli were taken to be a consequence
of the learning-dependent connections formed between the
neuronal representations of these stimuli.
To directly explore the emergence of pair-coding responses,
Messinger et al. (2001) recorded from IT neurons while monkeys
learned new stimulus pairings. For many neurons, the pattern of
stimulus selectivity changed incrementally as pair learning
progressed: responses to paired stimuli became more similar
and responses to stimuli that had not been paired became
less similar. The time course of this ‘‘associative neuronal
plasticity’’ matched the time course of learning and the presenceNeuronof neuronal changes depended upon
whether learning actually occurred (i.e.,
if the monkey failed to learn new pairings,
neuronal selectivity did not change). A
snapshot of the Messinger et al. (2001)
results taken at the end of training reveals
a pattern of neuronal selectivity that
closely matches the findings of Sakai
and Miyashita (1991).
The emergence of pair-coding
responses in IT cortex supports the
conclusion that learning strengthens
connectivity between the relevant neu-
ronal representations. That enhancement
of connectivity may be regarded as
the process of associative memory
formation, the product of which is a
neuronal state that captures the memory,
i.e., the memory trace. This is precisely
the interpretation that Miyashita and
colleagues (e.g., Miyashita, 1993), and
subsequently Messinger et al. (2001),
have applied to the finding of pair-coding
neurons in IT cortex, and it is consistent
with neuropsychological data that iden-tifies IT cortex as a long-term repository of visual memories
(see below).
Mechanisms of Associative Neuronal Plasticity
in IT Cortex
Visual paired association learning is dependent upon the integ-
rity of the hippocampus and cortical areas of themedial temporal
lobe (MTL) (Murray et al., 1993). These areas, which include the
entorhinal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices, receive
inputs from and are a source of feedback to IT cortex (see
Figure 2;Webster et al., 1991). The learning impairment following74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 229
Neuron
PerspectiveMTL lesions appears to be one of memory formation and the
MTL areas are thus, under normal conditions, believed to exert
their influence by enabling structural reorganization of local
circuits in the presumed site of storage, i.e., IT cortex (Miyashita,
1993; Squire et al., 2004; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991). This
hypothesis is supported by the finding that MTL lesions also
eliminate the formation of pair-coding responses in IT cortex
(Higuchi and Miyashita, 1996).
Exactly how MTL regions contribute to the strengthening of
connections between the neuronal representations of paired
stimuli—with the attendant associative learning and neuronal
response changes—is unknown. There are, nonetheless,
good reasons to suspect the involvement of a Hebbian mecha-
nism for enhancement of synaptic efficacy. Specifically, the
temporal coincidence of stimuli during learning may cause
coincident patterns of neuronal activity, which may lead, in
turn, to a strengthening of synaptic connections between the
neuronal representations of the paired stimuli (e.g., Yakovlev
et al., 1998). This conclusion is supported by the finding that
associative plasticity in IT cortex is correlated with the appear-
ance of molecular-genetic markers for synaptic plasticity:
mRNAs encoding for brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF)
and for the transcription factor zif268 (Miyashita et al., 1998;
Tokuyama et al., 2000). BDNF is known to play a role in
activity-dependent synaptic plasticity (Lu, 2003). zif268 is a
transcriptional regulator that leads to gene products necessary
for structural changes that underlie plasticity (Knapska and
Kaczmarek, 2004).
Is Associative Neuronal Plasticity Unique to IT Cortex?
The inferior temporal cortex was chosen as the initial target for
study of associative neuronal plasticity for a number of reasons.
This region of visual cortex was, for many years, termed ‘‘asso-
ciation cortex.’’ Although this designation originally reflected the
belief that the temporal lobe represents a point at which informa-
tion from different sensory modalities is associated (Flechsig,
1876), the term was later used to refer, more generally, to the
presumed site of Locke’s ‘‘association of ideas.’’
This view received early support from neuropsychological
studies demonstrating that temporal lobe lesions in both humans
and monkeys selectively impair the ability to recognize visual
objects, while leaving basic visual sensitivities intact (Alexander
and Albert, 1983; Brown and Schafer, 1888; Kluver and Bucy,
1939; Lissauer, 1988). Along the same lines, the classic explora-
tions of the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (Penfield and Perot,
1963) revealed that electrical stimulation of the human temporal
lobe commonly elicits reports of visual memories.
The anatomical connections of IT cortex also support a role
in object recognition and visual memory (Figure 2). IT cortex
lies at the pinnacle of the ventral cortical visual processing
stream and its neurons receive convergent projections from
many visual areas at lower ranks, thus affording integration
of information from a variety of visual submodalities (Desimone
et al., 1980; Ungerleider, 1984). As noted above, IT cortex is
also reciprocally connected with MTL structures that are
critical for acquisition of declarative memories (Milner, 1972;
Mishkin, 1982; Murray et al., 1993; Squire and Zola-Morgan,
1991).230 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Finally, the visual response properties of IT neurons, which
have been explored in much detail over the past 40 years, also
exhibit features that suggest a role in object recognition and
visual memory (for review see Gross et al., 1985; Miyashita,
1993). Most importantly, IT neurons are known to respond selec-
tively to complex objects—often those with some behavioral
significance to the observer, such as faces (Desimone et al.,
1984; Gross et al., 1969).
Based on this collective body of evidence, it would seem that
IT cortex is unique among visual areas and strongly implicated as
a storage site for long-term associative memories. Yet, there are
reasons to suspect that associative neuronal plasticity may be
a general property of sensory cortices. Evidence for this comes
in part from functional brain imaging studies that have found
learning-dependent activity changes in early cortical visual areas
(e.g., Shulman et al., 1999; Wheeler et al., 2000). Motivated
by these findings, Schlack and Albright (2007) explored the
possibility that associative learning might influence response
properties in the middle temporal visual area (area MT), which
occupies a relatively early position in the cortical visual process-
ing hierarchy (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1979).
MT Neurons Exhibit Associative Plasticity
In an experiment that represents a simple analog to the paired-
association learning studies of Sakai and Miyashita (1991) and
Messinger et al. (2001), Schlack and Albright (2007) trained
monkeys to associate directions of stimulus motion with
stationary arrows. Thus, for example, monkeys learned that an
upward-pointing arrow was associated with a pattern of dots
moving in an upward direction, a downward arrow was associ-
ated with downward motion, etc. (Figures 3A and 3B).
Moving stimuli were used for this training because it is well
known that such stimuli elicit robust responses from the vast
majority of neurons in cortical visual area MT (Albright, 1984).
In macaque monkeys, where it has been most intensively
studied, areaMT is a small cortical region (Figure 2) that lies pos-
teriorly along the lower bank of the superior temporal sulcus
(Gattass and Gross, 1981) and which receives direct input from
primary visual cortex (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1979). MT
neurons are highly selective for the direction of stimulus motion,
and the area is believed to be a key component of the neural
substrates of visual motion perception (for review, see Albright,
1993).
If MT neurons have potential for associative plasticity similar to
that seen in IT cortex, the behavioral pairing of motion directions
with arrow directions should lead to a convergence of responses
to the paired stimuli, overtly detectable in MT as emergent
responses to the arrows. Moreover, those responses should
be tuned for arrow direction, and the form of that tuning should
depend on the specific associations learned. Schlack and
Albright (2007) tested these hypotheses by recording from MT
neurons after the motion-arrow associations were learned.
Many MT neurons exhibited selectivity for the direction of the
static arrow—a property not seen prior to learning, and seem-
ingly heretical to the accepted view thatMT neurons are primarily
selective for visual motion. Moreover, for individual neurons, the
arrow-direction tuning curve was a close match to the motion-
direction tuning curve (Figures 3C and 3D).
Figure 3. Emergent Stimulus Selectivity of Neurons in Cortical Visual Area MT following Paired Association Learning
(A) Rhesus monkeys learned to associate up and down motions with up and down arrows.
(B) Schematic depiction of task used to train motion-arrow pairings. Trial sequence is portrayed as a series of temporal frames. Each frame represents the video
display and operant response (eyemovement to chosen stimulus). All neuronal data were collected following extensive training on this task, and during behavioral
trials in which monkeys were simply required to fixate a central target.
(C) Data from representative MT neuron. Top row illustrates responses to four motion directions. Spike raster displays of individual trial responses are plotted
above cumulative spike-density functions. Vertical dashed lines correspond from left to right to stimulus onset, motion onset, and stimulus offset. Gray rectangle
indicates analysis window. The cell was highly directionally selective. Bottom row illustrates responses to four static arrows. The animal previously learned to
associate arrow direction with motion direction. Plotting conventions are same as in upper row. The cell was highly selective for arrow direction.
(D) Mean responses of neuron shown in (C) to motion directions (red curve) and corresponding static arrow directions (blue curve), indicated in polar format.
Preferred directions for the two stimulus types (red and blue vectors) are nearly identical.
From Schlack and Albright (2007).
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the learned association with motions rather than specific phys-
ical attributes of the arrow stimulus, Schlack and Albright
(2007) trained a second monkey on the opposite associations
(e.g., upward motion associated with downward arrow). As
expected from the learning hypothesis, the emergent tuning
again reflected the association (e.g., if the preferred direction
for motion was upward, the preferred direction for the arrow
was downward) rather than the specific properties of the associ-
ated stimulus.What Is Represented by Learning-Dependent Neuronal
Selectivity in Area MT?
On the surface of things, the plasticity seen in area MT appears
identical to that previously observed in IT cortex: the neuronal
response change is learning-dependent and can be character-
ized as a convergence of responses to the paired stimuli. One
might suppose, therefore, that the phenomenon in MT also
reflects mechanisms for long-term memory storage. There are,
however, several reasons to believe that the plasticity observed
in MT reflects rather different functions and mechanisms.Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 231
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another by the availability of substrates for long-term memory
storage. In the IT experiments described above the paired stimuli
(arbitrary complex objects) are in all cases plausibly represented
by separate groups of IT neurons, whichmeans that connections
between those representations could be forged locally within IT
cortex. The same is not true for areaMT, as there exists no native
selectivity for stationary arrows (or for most other nonmoving
stimuli).
IT andMT are also distinguished from one another by the pres-
ence versus absence of feedback from cortical areas of the
medial temporal lobe (see Figure 2). As noted above, these
MTL areas are essential for learning of visual paired-associates
(presumably also including those between arrows and motions),
and they are believed to enable memory formation via selective
modification of local circuits at the targets of their feedback
projections. IT cortex is one of those targets, but area MT is
not (Suzuki and Amaral, 1994). Although it remains to be seen
whether MTL lesions block the emergence of pair-coding
responses in area MT, as they do in IT cortex, the evident
connectional dissimilarities between MT and IT suggest that
the associative neuronal plasticity in MT is not the basis of
memory storage.
If not memory storage, what then is represented by the
observed learning-dependent responses in MT? One possibility
is that they simply represent the properties of the retinal stimulus,
i.e., the direction of the arrow. Alternatively, the learning-depen-
dent responses may have nothing directly to do with the
retinal stimulus but, rather, represent the motion that is recalled
in the presence of the arrow. The distinction between these two
possibilities—a response that represents the bottom-up stim-
ulus versus a response that represents top-down associative
recall—is fundamental to this discussion.
According to the bottom-up argument, the cortical circuitry in
area MT has been co-opted, as a result of extensive training on
the motion-arrow association task, for the purpose of represent-
ing a novel stimulus type. This argument maintains that motion
processing is the default operation in MT, but the inherent
plasticity of cortex allows these neurons to take on other
functional roles as dictated by the statistics of the observer’s
environment. Although the evidence to date cannot rule out
this possibility, it defies the not unreasonable assumption that
properties of early visual neurons must remain stable in order
to yield a stable interpretation of the world (van Wezel and
Britten, 2002). By contrast with the bottom-up argument, there
is considerable parsimony in the view that the emergent
responses to arrow stimuli are manifestations of a top-down
signaling process, the purpose of which is to achieve associative
recall. Importantly, this view asserts that area MT remains stably
committed to motion processing, with recognition that the
same motion-sensitive neurons may become activated by either
bottom-up or top-down signals.
Visual Associative Recall
The storage of information in memory and the subsequent
retrieval of that information are generally viewed as interdepen-
dent processes rooted in overlapping neuronal substrates
(e.g., Anderson and Bower, 1973). Evidence reviewed above232 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.suggests that the associative neuronal plasticity—the emer-
gence of pair-coding responses—seen in IT cortex is a manifes-
tation of memory storage. At the same time, the response to
a paired stimulus is a demonstration of retrieval, and thus can
also be viewed as ‘‘recall-related’’ activity.
By contrast with IT cortex, evidence indicates that the
learning-dependent responses to arrows in area MT are solely
a manifestation of retrieval. They are, in a literal sense, a cued
top-down reproduction of the activity pattern that would be
elicited in MT by a moving stimulus projected upon the retina.
In other words, the recall-related activity seen in area MT is
a neural correlate of visual imagery of motion. This provocative
proposal naturally raises two important questions: (1) what is
the source of the top-down recall-related activity, and (2) what
is it for? These questions will be addressed in detail after a brief
consideration of other evidence for neural correlates of visual
imagery.
A Common Neuronal Substrate for Visual Imagery
and Perception
Why don’t you just go ahead and imagine what you want?
You don’t need my permission. How can I know what’s in
your head? (Haruki Murakami, 2005, Kafka on the Shore)
The arguments summarized above maintain that the selective
pattern of activity in MT to static arrows reflects the recalled
pictorial memory—imagery—of motion, which is represented in
the same cortical region and by the same neuronal code as the
original motion stimulus. Although the evidence is striking in
this case, the concept of common substrates for imagery and
perception is not new. This idea can be traced to 1644, when
Rene Descartes (1972), argued that visual signals originating in
the eye and those originating frommemory are both experienced
via the ‘‘impression’’ of an image onto a common brain structure.
(Descartes incorrectly believed that structure to be the pineal
gland.) The same argument—known as the ‘‘principle of percep-
tual equivalence’’ (Finke, 1989)—has been developed repeatedly
and explicitly over the past century by psychologists, neurosci-
entists, and cognitive scientists alike (e.g., Behrmann, 2000;
Damasio, 1989; Farah, 1985; Finke, 1989; Hebb, 1949; James,
1890; Kosslyn, 1994; Merzenich and Kaas, 1980; Nyberg et al.,
2000; Shepard and Cooper, 1982).
Modern-day enthusiasm for the belief that imagery and
perception are mediated by common neuronal substrates and
events grew initially from the commonplace observation that
the subjective experiences associated with imagery and sensory
stimulation are similar in many respects (e.g., Finke, 1980; Podg-
orny and Shepard, 1978). Empirical support for the hypothesis
followed with studies demonstrating that perception reflects
interactions between imagery and sensory stimulation (e.g.,
Farah, 1985; Ishai and Sagi, 1995; Peterson and Graham,
1974): for example, imagery of the letter ‘‘T’’ selectively facilitates
detection of a ‘‘T’’ stimulus projected on the retina (Farah, 1985).
More recently, the common substrates hypothesis has
received backing in abundance from human functional brain
imaging studies. These studies, in which subjects are either
asked to image specific stimuli, or studies in which imagery is
‘‘forced’’ by cued associative recall, have documented patterns
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cortical visual areas (e.g., D’Esposito et al., 1997; Ishai et al.,
2000; Knauff et al., 2000; Kosslyn et al., 1995; O’Craven and
Kanwisher, 2000; Reddy et al., 2010; Slotnick et al., 2005;
Stokes et al., 2009, 2011; Vaidya et al., 2002; Wheeler et al.,
2000), including area MT (Goebel et al., 1998; Kourtzi and
Kanwisher, 2000; Shulman et al., 1999)—patterns that appear
similar in many respects to those elicited by a corresponding
retinal stimulus. Along the same lines, electrophysiological
recordings from deep electrodes in the temporal cortex of
human subjects have revealed responses that were highly selec-
tive for the pictorial content of volitional visual imagery (Kreiman
et al., 2000).
Neurophysiological studies that have addressed this issue in
animals are rare, in part because visual imagery is fundamentally
subjective and thus not directly accessible to anyone but the
imager. A solution to this problem involves inducing imagery
through the force of association. This is, of course, the approach
used in the aforementioned studies of association learning in
visual areas IT (Messinger et al., 2001; Sakai and Miyashita,
1991) andMT (Schlack and Albright, 2007). Although these stand
as the only explicit studies of visual imagery at the cellular level,
there are several other indications of support in the neurophysi-
ological literature.
For example, Assad and Maunsell (1995) presented monkeys
with a moving spot that followed a predictable path from the
visual periphery to the center of gaze. Recordings were made
from motion-sensitive neurons in cortical visual area MST.
Receptive fields were selected to lie along the motion trajectory,
and the passing of the spot elicited the expected response. On
some trials, however, the spot disappeared and reappeared
along its trajectory, as if passing behind an occluding surface.
Although the stimulus never crossed the receptive field on occlu-
sion trials, its inferred trajectory did, and many MST neurons
responded in a manner indistinguishable from the response to
real receptive field motion. A plausible interpretation of these
findings is that the neuronal response on occlusion trials reflects
pictorial recall of motion, elicited by the presence of associative
cues, such as the visible beginning and end points of the trajec-
tory (see Albright, 1995).
Such effects are not limited to the visual domain. Haenny,
Maunsell and Schiller (1988) trained monkeys on a tactile-visual
orientation match-to-sample task (cross-modal match-to-
sample is a special case of paired-association learning), in an
effort to explore the effect of attentional cuing on visual
responses. Recordings in area V4 of visual cortex revealed,
among other things, orientation-tuned responses to the tactile
cue stimulus, prior to the appearance of the visual target (see
Figure 4 in Haenny et al., 1988). The authors refer to this
response as ‘‘an abstract representation of cued orientation,’’
which may be true in some sense, but in light of the findings of
Schlack and Albright (2007), one can interpret the V4 response
to a tactile stimulus as a neural correlate of the visually recalled
orientation.
Early experiments by FrankMorrell might also be interpreted in
this vein (for review, see Morrell, 1961). In one set of studies,
Morrell reported auditory responses in primary visual cortex of
animals that had been trained to associate auditory and visualstimuli (Morrell et al., 1957). While highly controversial at the
time, these results now seem consistent with the common
substrates hypothesis. Similarly, using cross-modal associative
learning, Joaquin Fuster and colleagues (e.g., Zhou and Fuster,
2000) have provided several electrophysiological demonstra-
tions of recall-related activity in the auditory and somatosensory
cortices.
What Is the Source of Recall-Related Signals in Visual
Cortex?
As summarized above, the neuronal plasticity in IT cortex that
accompanies paired-association learning is likely to bemediated
via local circuit changes within this visual area (Figure 4A), which
in turn provide the foundation for associative recall. Evidence
indicates that this retrieval process takes two basic forms:
automatic and active (Miyashita, 2004). In the automatic case,
a bottom-up cue stimulus directly activates the neuronal repre-
sentation of an associated stimulus, via the pre-established links
in IT cortex. In the active case, retrieval is presumed to occur
under executive control mediated by the prefrontal cortex. In
this scenario, prefrontal cortex maintains stimulus and task-
relevant information in working memory. Top-down signals
from prefrontal cortex reactivate associative memory circuits in
IT cortex as dictated by the behavioral context at hand (Tomita
et al., 1999).
The situation in MT differs primarily in that the paired stimuli
are unlikely to be associated via changes in local connections
within this visual area. One possibility is that the visual associa-
tions learned in the experiment of Schlack and Albright (2007) are
stored via circuit changes in IT cortex, in a manner no different
from that seen in earlier studies of pair-coding responses in IT
(Messinger et al., 2001; Sakai and Miyashita, 1991). According
to this hypothesis, the recall-related activity observed in MT
reflects a backward spread of feature-specific activation, origi-
nating with the memory trace in IT (via automatic or active
processes) and descending through visual cortex (Figure 4B).
Whatever the source of the feedback, there are several
provocative features of the recall event that may inform an
understanding of the underlying mechanism. To begin with, the
neurophysiological data indicate that recall-related signals are
highly specific. Indeed, in areaMT the selectivity for stimuli asso-
ciated with directions of motion is nearly indistinguishable from
the selectivity for the motions themselves (Schlack and Albright,
2007). This selectivity suggests a high degree of anatomical
specificity in the feedback signals that activate MT neurons
under these conditions.
Second, the feedback signals would seem to possess enor-
mous content flexibility, given that the number of learnable asso-
ciations for a given stimulus is vast (if not infinite). One can, for
example, learn associations between directions of motion and
many arbitrary visual stimuli (in addition to the arrows used by
Schlack and Albright [2007]), such as colors, shapes, faces, or
alphanumeric characters, as well as with non-visual stimuli,
such as tones (A. Schlack et al., 2008, Soc. Neurosci., abstract)
or tactile movements. The obvious implications are that the
source of top-down signaling has access to a wide range of
types of sensory information, and that this range may be mani-
fested in the recall-related responses in visual cortex.Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 233
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Figure 4. Stylized Depiction of Hypothesized Neuronal Circuits for
Acquisition of Visual Associative Memories and Pictorial Recall of
Those Memories
See Figure 2 for areal abbreviations.
(A) Acquisition of visual associative memory. Black arrows indicate flow of
information from primary visual cortex (V1) up to inferior (IT) cortex. The two
arrows so ascending indicate generic connections that underlie representation
of two different visual stimuli (e.g., A and B). Learning of an association
between the two stimuli is mediated by the formation of reciprocal connections
between the corresponding neuronal representations in IT cortex. This asso-
ciative learning and circuit reorganization are dependent on feedback from the
medial temporal lobe (MTL).
(B) Pictorial recall of visual associative memory. If object B is viewed,
a selective pattern of activation ascends through visual cortex, ultimately
activating the neuronal representation of object B in area IT. This neuronal
representation of object B may also be activated indirectly by either of two
means when object B is not visible. In ‘‘automatic’’ recall mode, the neuronal
representation of object A is activated (ascending arrow from V1 to IT) by
viewing that stimulus. The neuronal representation of the paired stimulus
(object B) becomes activated in turn via local connections within IT. In ‘‘active’’
recall mode, the neuronal representation of object B is activated in IT cortex
when that stimulus is held in working memory (descending arrow from
prefrontal cortex to IT). In both cases, a visual image of the stimulus so recalled
results from a descending cascade of selective activation in visual cortex,
which matches the pattern that would normally be elicited by viewing the
stimulus. Under most conditions, active and automatic modes correspond,
respectively, to the processes underlying what we have termed explicit and
implicit imagery.
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flexible, inasmuch as cued associative recall is context-depen-
dent. The visual images recalled by the sight of a shovel, for234 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.example, may depend upon whether the shovel is viewed in
the garden or the cemetery. Although it remains to be seen
whether recall-related neuronal responses in areas MT and
IT are context dependent (but see Naya et al., 1996), the
context dependence of imagery itself implies that the relevant
top-down signals are dynamically engaged rather than hard-
wired. The task of identifying feedback mechanisms and circuits
that satisfy these multiple constraints is daunting, to say the
least, but their recognition casts new light on cortical visual pro-
cessing.
What Is the Function of Visual Imagery?
Additional insights into top-down signaling and its contribution to
perceptual experience may come from consideration of what
purpose it serves. Much has been written about the functions
of visual imagery (e.g., Farah, 1985; Hebb, 1968; James, 1890;
Kosslyn, 1994; Neisser, 1976; Paivio, 1965; Shepard and
Cooper, 1982). To understand these functions, it is useful to
consider two types of imagery: explicit and implicit.
Explicit Visual Imagery
Scientific and colloquial discussions of visual imagery havemost
commonly focused on a class of operations that enable an indi-
vidual to evaluate the properties of objects or scenes that are not
currently visible. This type of imagery is typically both explicit
and volitional—corresponding to the ‘‘active’’ retrieval process
described above (see Miyashita, 2004)—and is conjured on
demand to serve specific cognitive or behavioral goals. Explicit
imagery may be retrospective or prospective. The retrospective
variety involves scrutiny via imagery of material previously seen
and remembered, such as the examination in one’s mind’s eye
of the kitchen counter in order to determine whether the car
keys are there. Prospective imagery—what Schacter et al.
(2007) call ‘‘imagining the future’’—includes the evaluation of
visual object or scene transformations, or wholesale fabrication
of objects and scenes based on information from other sources,
such as language. For example, one might imagine the place-
ment of the new couch in the sitting room, without the trouble
of actually moving the couch. (Watson [1968] famously used
this form of visual imagery to transpose base pairs—‘‘I happily
lay awake with pairs of adenine residues whirling in front of my
closed eyes’’—as he narrowed in on the structure of DNA.) Simi-
larly, any reader of the Harry Potter series has surely manufac-
tured rich pictorial representations of the fictional Hogwarts
Castle.
For the present discussion, it is noteworthy that explicit
imagery often occurs in the presence of retinal stimuli to which
the conjured image has no perceptual bearing—physical,
semantic, or otherwise. For example, I can readily and richly
picture the high-stepping march of Robert Preston’s Music
Man (trailed of course by the River City Boys’ Band), but that
dynamic image is (thankfully) perceptually distinct from the world
in front of me (though perhaps causing interference; see Segal
and Fusella [1970], for example).
Evidence for neural correlates of explicit visual imagery is
plentiful. In particular, the numerous functional brain imaging
studies cited above (as evidence localizing visual imagery to
visual cortex) were conducted primarily under conditions of
Figure 5. Demonstration of the Influence of Associative Pictorial
Recall (Top-Down Signaling) on the Interpretation of a Retinal
Stimulus (Bottom-Up Signaling)
To most observers, this figure initially appears as a random pattern with no
clear figural interpretation. The perceptual experience elicited by this stimulus
is radically (and perhaps permanently) different after viewing the pattern shown
in Figure 8.
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generate images of specific stimuli.
Implicit Visual Imagery
There exists a second functional role for visual imagery, which is,
by contrast, implicit (‘‘automatic’’) and externally driven, and
which plays a fundamental and ubiquitous, albeit less commonly
recognized, role in normal visual perception. This function
follows from the proposition that perceptual experience falls at
varying positions along a continuum between the extremes of
pure stimulus and pure imagery (e.g., Thomas, 2011), with the
position at any point in time determined primarily by stimulus
quality and knowledge of the environment (James, 1890). Under
most circumstances, implicit visual images are elicited by
learned associative cues and serve to augment sensory data
with ‘‘likely’’ interpretations, in order to overcome the ever-
present noise, ambiguity, and incompleteness of the retinal
image. For example, with little scrutiny, I regularly perceive the
blurry and partially occluded stimulus that passes my office
window to be my colleague Chuck Stevens, simply because
experience tells me that Chuck is a common property of my envi-
ronment. Similarly, the pattern in Figure 5may be ambiguous and
uninterpretable upon first viewing, but perceived clearly after
experience with Figure 8. According to this view, imagery is
not simply a thing apart, an internal representation distinct
from the scene before our eyes, but rather it is part-and-parcel
of perception.
This take on visual imagery is not new. The 19th century Asso-
ciationist philosopher John Stuart Mill (1865) viewed perception
as an internal representation of the ‘‘permanent possibilities of
sensation.’’ Accordingly, perception derives from inferences
about the environment in the absence of complete sensory
cues. Similarly, David Hume (1967) noted a ‘‘universal tendency
among mankind. to transfer to every object, those qualities
with which they are familiarly acquainted.’’ William James
(1890) expanded upon this theme by noting that ‘‘perception is
of probable things’’ and that visual experience is completed
by ‘‘farther facts associated with the object of sensation.’’
Helmholtz (1924) developed a similar idea in his concept ofunconscious inference, according to which perception is based
on both sensory data and inferences about probabilities based
upon experience.
More recently, these arguments have been echoed in the
concept of ‘‘amodal completion’’ (Kanizsa, 1979)—the imaginal
restoration of occluded image features, whose ‘‘perceptual exis-
tence is not verifiable by any sensory modality.’’ Bruner and
Postman (1949) spoke of ‘‘directive’’ factors, which reflect an
observer’s inferences about the environment and operate to
maximize percepts consistent with those inferences (‘‘one
smitten by love does rather poorly in perceiving the linear char-
acteristics of his beloved’’). Finally, this view has acquired the
weight of logical formalism through Bayesian approaches to
visual processing (e.g., Kersten et al., 2004; Knill and Richards,
1996): learned associations constitute information about the
statistics of the observer’s environment, which come into play
lawfully as the visual system attempts to identify the environ-
mental causes of retinal stimulation (see also Brunswik, 1956).
More generally, this line of thinking incorporates a key feature
of associative recall—completion of a remembered whole from
a sensory part—while assigning a vital functional role to visual
imagery in this process.
Empirical support for the implicit imagery hypothesis derives
from a long-standing literature addressing the influence of
associative experience on perception (e.g., Ball and Sekuler,
1980; Bartleson, 1960; Bruner et al., 1951; Farah, 1985; Hansen
et al., 2006; Hurlbert and Ling, 2005; Ishai and Sagi, 1995,
1997a, 1997b; Mast et al., 2001; Siple and Springer, 1983),
which dates at least to Ewald Hering’s (1878) concept of
‘‘memory colors’’—e.g., perceived color should be biased
toward yellow if the color originates from a banana. In one of
the most provocative experiments of this genre (made famous
for its use by Thomas Kuhn [1962] as a metaphor for scientific
discovery), Bruner and Postman (1949) used ‘‘trick’’ playing
cards to demonstrate an influence of top-down imaginal influ-
ences on perception. The trick cards were created simply by
altering the color of a given suit—a red six of spades, for
example. Human subjects were shown a series of cards with
brief presentations; some cards were trick and the remainder
normal. With startling frequency, subjects failed to identify the
trick cards and instead reported them as normal. Upon ques-
tioning, these subjects often defended their perceptual reports,
even after being allowed to scrutinize the trick cards, thus
demonstrating that strongly learned associations between color
and pattern are capable of sharply biasing perceptual judg-
ments toward the imagery end of the of the stimulus-imagery
continuum.
A Neuronal Representation of Probable Things
The two forms of imagery identified above are phenomenologi-
cally and functionally distinct, but they may well rely upon
common substrates for selective top-down activation of visual
cortex, i.e., recall-related activity (Figure 4B). It is instructive to
consider how that neuronal activity relates to perceptual state
under different imagery conditions. The studies of recall-related
neuronal activity in areas IT and MT summarized above were
conducted under conditions deemed likely to elicit explicit
imagery. For example, from the study of Schlack and AlbrightNeuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 235
Figure 6. Conceptual Model to Account for Perceptual
Consequences of Interactions between Stimulus and Imagery
Signals in Visual Cortex
(A–D) Represent hypothesized patterns of activity elicited in area MT by
bottom-up signals of different direction and magnitude and a top-down signal
of fixed direction and magnitude. Arrowed segments symbolize cortical
direction columns (plotted in circle for graphical convenience). Green and red
polar plots indicate hypothesized activations of each directional column eli-
cited, respectively, by bottom-up stimulus and top-down imagery signals. Blue
curve indicates weighted sum of the two signals (stronger signals have
disproportionately large weights). Black circle represents baseline activity of
each column. (A) Stimulus signal (green) corresponds to leftward motion and
the activity pattern is modeled as low coherence, high directional variance.
Imagery signal (red) corresponds to rightwardmotion and the activity pattern is
modeled as mid-level coherence, low variance. The weighted sum of these
discordant activity patterns (blue) exhibits a bias toward the imagery direction
(rightward). The ratio of rightward to leftward perceptual reports is predicted to
be proportional to the ratio of activities (blue curve) for the corresponding
neurons, favoring rightward in this case, despite a leftward stimulus. (B)
Stimulus signal (green) corresponds to directional noise and the activity pattern
236 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.
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moving dots) appears in the form it has been previously seen
and serves as an explicit template for an expected target. Under
these conditions, the image may have no direct or meaningful
influence over the percept of the retinal stimulus that elicited it.
Correspondingly, the observed recall-related activity in area
MT may have no bearing on the percept of the arrow stimulus
that was simultaneously visible.
It seems likely, however, that the retrieval substrate that
affords explicit imagery is more commonly—indeed ubiqui-
tously—employed for implicit imagery, which is notable for its
functional interactions with the retinal stimulus. Indeed, one
mechanistic interpretation of the claim that perceptual experi-
ence falls routinely at varying positions along a stimulus-imagery
continuum is that bottom-up stimulus and top-down recall-
related signals are not simply coexistent in visual cortex, but
perpetually interact to yield percepts of ‘‘probable things.’’
This mechanistic proposal can be conveniently fleshed-out
and employed to make testable predictions following the logic
that Newsome and colleagues (e.g., Nichols and Newsome,
2002) have used to address the interaction between bottom-
upmotion signals and electrical microstimulation of MT neurons.
(This analogy works because microstimulation can be consid-
ered a crude form of top-down signal.) As illustrated schemati-
cally in Figure 6, bottom-up (stimulus) and top-down (imaginal)
inputs to area MT should yield distinct activity patterns across
the spectrum of direction columns (Albright et al., 1984). Accord-
ing to this simple model, perceptual experience is determined as
a weighted average of these activity distributions (an assump-
tion consistent with perceived motion in the presence of two
real moving components [Adelson and Bergen, 1985; Qian
et al., 1994; Stromeyer et al., 1984; van Santen and Sperling,
1985]). Under normal circumstances, the imaginal compo-
nent—elicited by cued associative recall—would be expected
to reinforce the stimulus component, which has obviousis modeled as 0%coherence. Imagery signal (red) is same as (A). Theweighted
sum of these discordant activity patterns (blue) exhibits a bias toward the
imagery direction (rightward), despite an incoherent stimulus. The ratio of
perceptual reports is predicted to favor rightward in this case, despite an
ambiguous stimulus. (C) Stimulus signal (green) corresponds to rightward
motion and the activity pattern is modeled as low coherence, high directional
variance. Imagery signal (red) is same as (A). Theweighted sumof these activity
patterns (blue) reflects the synergy between stimulus and imagery signals. The
ratio of perceptual reports in this case is predicted to exhibit a moderate
rightward bias above that resulting from stimulus signal alone. (D) Stimulus
signal (green) corresponds to rightward motion and the activity pattern is
modeled as high coherence, low directional variance. Imagery signal (red) is
same as (A). The weighted sum of these activity patterns (blue) reflects the
synergy between stimulus and imagery signals. Because the stimulus is strong
and unambiguous, the imagery signal yields an insignificant rightward bias
above that resulting from stimulus signal alone.
(E) Plot of expected psychometric functions for right-left direction discrimi-
nation. Direction discrimination performance is predicted to be proportional to
the relative strengths of activation of neurons in opposing (rightward versus
leftward) direction columns. Stimulus-only condition is indicated in black.
Imagery condition, for which rightward motion has been associatively paired
with the color red, is indicated in blue. The upward shift of the psychometric
function reflects the perceived directional bias toward rightward motion in the
red condition. The four arrows correspond to the imagery-induced directional
biases elicited for conditions (A)–(D) above. The bias is large for conditions
below threshold (when the stimulus is ambiguous), but the imagery-induced
bias is small when the stimulus signal is robust and ambiguous.
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(e.g., Figure 6C).
Potentially more revealing predictions occur for the unlikely
case in which stimulus and imaginal components are diametri-
cally opposed (Figure 6A). The resulting activity distribution
naturally depends upon the relative strengths of the stimulus
and imaginal components. It follows that if the imaginal compo-
nent is constant, its sway over perceived direction of motion
will depend dramatically upon the strength of the retinal stim-
ulus (Figures 6B–6D and 6E). In the extreme, this model
predicts that a stimulus that is directionally ambiguous or com-
posed of dynamic noise will yield a percept of directional
motion when the imaginal component is directionally strong
(Figure 6B).
Support for this mechanistic interpretation comes in part
from an experiment by Backus and colleagues (Haijiang et al.,
2006). These investigators used classical conditioning to train
associations between two directions of motion and two values
of a covert second cue (e.g., stimulus position). Following
learning, human subjects were presented with directionally
ambiguous (bistable) motion stimuli along with one or the other
cue value. Subjects exhibited marked biases in the direction of
perceived motion, which were dictated by the associated cue,
even though subjects professed no awareness of the cue or
its meaning. The discovery of recall-related activity in area MT
(Schlack and Albright, 2007) suggests that these effects of
association-based recall on perception are mediated through
integration of bottom-up (ambiguous stimulus) and top-down
(reliable implicit imagery) signals at the level of individual cortical
neurons.
One important prediction of this mechanistic hypothesis is
that the influence of top-down associative recall on perception
should, under normal circumstances, be inversely proportional
to the ‘‘strength’’ of the bottom-up sensory signal (Figure 6). To
test this prediction, A. Schlack et al. (2008, Soc. Neurosci.,
abstract) designed an experiment in which the influence of asso-
ciative recall on reports of perceived direction of motion could be
systematically quantified over a range of input strengths. The
visual stimuli used for this experiment consisted of dynamic
dot displays, in which the fraction of dots moving in the same
direction (i.e., ‘‘coherently’’) could be varied from 0% to 100%,
while the remaining (noncoherent) dots moved randomly. By
varying the motion coherence strength, the relative influence
of bottom-up and top-down signals could be evaluated over
a range of input conditions. These stimuli lend the additional
advantage that there is an extensive literature in which they
have been used to quantify perceptual and neuronal sensitivity
to visual motion (e.g., Britten et al., 1992; Croner and Albright,
1997, 1999; Newsome et al., 1989).
The experiment conducted by Schlack et al. (2008, Soc.
Neurosci., abstract) consisted of three phases. In the first
(‘‘pretrain’’) phase, human subjects performed an up-down
direction discrimination task using stimuli of varying motion
signal strength. The observed psychometric functions confirmed
previous reports: the point of subjective equality (equal
frequency of responses in the two opposite directions) occurred
where the motion signal was at or near 0%. In the second
(‘‘training’’) phase, subjects were exposed to repeated pairingsof the directions and colors of moving dot patterns, e.g.,
upward-green, downward-red. This classical associative con-
ditioning continued 1 hr/day for 20 days and was followed
by the third (‘‘posttrain’’) phase of the experiment, in which
direction discrimination performance was reassessed using
dot patterns of the two colors employed in phase two (red and
green).
Schlack et al. (2008, Soc. Neurosci., abstract) argued that the
associative training of phase two would result in cue-dependent
recall-related activity in area MT. Reports of perceived direction
of motion in phase three should thus reflect a combination of
top-down (imaginal) and bottom-up (stimulus) motion signals.
Furthermore, the influence of the imaginal component should
depend inversely upon the strength of the stimulus component.
This is precisely what was observed: the psychometric func-
tions for direction discrimination obtained for red and for green
moving dot patterns were displaced relative to one another in
a manner consistent with perceptual biases introduced by
the associated color cue. These psychophysical findings, in
conjunction with the previous discovery of recall-related
activity in area MT (Schlack and Albright, 2007), lead to the
strong prediction that functions for neuronal discriminability
(neurometric functions) of motion direction will exhibit biases
that mirror the psychophysical bias, reflect cued associative
recall, and are accountable by the simple model outlined in
Figure 6.
Distinguishing Stimulus from Imagery
Considerations of the balance between stimulus and imagery
naturally raise the larger question of whether (and how) an
observer can distinguish between the two if they are both
manifested as activation of visual cortex. And, if so, under
what conditions does it make a difference? These questions
are not new, of course, having been raised repeatedly since
the 19th century in discussions of the clinical phenomenon
of hallucination (e.g., James, 1890; Richardson, 1969; Sully,
1888). The studies reviewed herein allow these questions to be
addressed in a modern neurobiological context.
Most modern neurobiological approaches to these questions
skirt the ‘‘perceptual equivalence’’ problem and begin instead
with the premise that the perceptual states elicited indepen-
dently by stimulus versus explicit imagery are, in fact, quite
distinct. While visual cortex may provide a common substrate
for representation, the perceptual distinction implies that there
are different neuronal states associated with stimulus versus
imagery. Human neuropsychological (see Behrmann, 2000,
and Bartolomeo, 2002, for review) and fMRI studies (e.g., Lee
et al., 2012) support this view. Broadly speaking, lesions of
more anterior regions along the ventral visual cortical stream—
particularly visual areas of the temporal lobe—may impair the
capacity to generate explicit visual images while leaving intact
the ability to perceive retinal stimuli (Farah et al., 1988; Moro
et al., 2008). Conversely, lesions of more posterior regions of
visual cortex—low- and mid-level visual processing areas—
may disrupt the perception of retinal stimuli without affecting
the ability to generate visual images (Bartolomeo et al., 1998;
Behrmann et al., 1992; Bridge et al., 2011; Chatterjee and South-
wood, 1995). Similarly, although fMRI studies reveal that retinalNeuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 237
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patterns of activity in visual cortex (Kosslyn et al., 1997), there
are readily detectable differences between these patterns (e.g.,
Amedi et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2012; Ishai et al., 2000; Roland
and Gulyas, 1994), which corroborate the neuropsychological
evidence for a stimulus-imagery dissociation and are presumed
to account for the differences in perceptual state.
These findings help to resolve a paradox posed by the findings
of Schlack and Albright (2007), in which bottom-up and top-
down activity patterns in area MT are seemingly equivalent
(see Figure 3), but the perceptual states associated with these
neuronal activities are not likely to be so. Simply put, isolated
recordings from area MT do not tell the full story; MT may be
part of the common neuronal substrate for representing stimulus
and imagery, but the perceptual states elicited in these experi-
ments are presumably distinguished by differential activation of
other cortical regions, such as those identified in the neuropsy-
chological and fMRI studies cited above.
While the presumption that stimulus and imagery elicit
different perceptual and neuronal states may generally hold for
explicit imagery, a more nuanced view emerges from implicit
imagery. Here, the stimulus-imagery distinction is largely
moot, as this view posits that perception reflects an ongoing
integration of stimulus and imagery signals in visual cortex—
observers are simply unaware of the source of the signals. In
most cases, imagery corroborates the retinal stimulus by filling
in detail based on prior experience. The possibility exists,
however, that the imagery signal reflects an incorrect associa-
tion or flawed premises about the environment, and perceptual
experience is none the wiser. If the imaginal component domi-
nates, as it often does in such cases, the result is a common-
place illusion: the coat rack may look like an intruder in the
hall, or the shrubbery is mistaken for a police car. The Bruner
and Postman (1949) ‘‘trick card’’ study, cited above, is a prime
example of such conditions, in which ‘‘imagination has all the
force of fact’’ (James, 1890).
There also exists a genre of magical performance art that
capitalizes upon illusions derived from flawed inferences—it
is the observer’s failure to distinguish stimulus from imagery
that makes this art possible. Consider, for example, the
‘‘vanishing ball illusion’’: in this simple yet compelling trick, the
magician repeatedly tosses a ball into the air. On the final toss,
the ball vanishes in mid flight (for video demonstration, see
Kuhn and Land [2006], http://www.cell.com/current-biology/
supplemental/S0960-9822(06)02331-1). In reality, the ball never
leaves the hand. The illusion is effected by the use of learned
cues that are visible to the observer, including the magician’s
hand and arm movements previously associated with a ball
toss, and the magician’s gaze directed along the usual path of
the ball. The observer’s inferences about environmental proper-
ties and events are probabilistically determined (from the associ-
ated cues) but the inferences are incorrect. According to the
implicit imagery hypothesis, these flawed inferences are none-
theless manifested as imagery of motion along the expected
path. Moreover, this imaginal contribution to perceptual experi-
ence is likely to bemediated by top-down activation of direction-
ally selective MT neurons, in a manner analogous to the effects
reported by Schlack and Albright (2007).238 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.In other cases of implicit imagery, however, such as a cloud
that looks like a poodle or a toast that resembles the Virgin
Mary, the imagined component may be robust but it is scarcely
confusable with the stimulus. A well-documented and experi-
mentally tractable form of this perceptual phenomenon is
variously termed ‘‘representational momentum’’ (Freyd, 1987;
Kourtzi, 2004; Senior et al., 2000), ‘‘implied motion’’ (Kourtzi
and Kanwisher, 2000; Krekelberg et al., 2003; Lorteije et al.,
2006), or ‘‘illusions of locomotion’’ (Arnheim, 1951), in which
a static image drawn from amoving sequence (such as an animal
in a predatory pounce) elicits an ‘‘impression’’ of the motion
sequence. This phenomenon is the basis of a common tech-
nique in painting, well-described since Leonardo (da Vinci,
1989), in which static visual features are employed to bring
a vibrant impression to canvas. Such impressions are ubiqui-
tous, perceptually robust, and nonvolitional (unlike explicit
imagery), but they are not confusable with stimulus motion.
Evidence nonetheless suggests that they also reflect top-down
pictorial recall of motion—the product of associative experience,
in which static elements of a motion sequence have been natu-
rally linked with the movement itself (Freyd, 1987). In support of
this view, static implied motion stimuli have been shown to elicit
fMRI signals selectively in human areas MT and MST (Kourtzi
and Kanwisher, 2000; Lorteije et al., 2006; Senior et al., 2000).
Krekelberg et al. (2003) have discovered similar effects for single
neurons in cortical areas MT and MST.
What then differentiates cases in which imagery and stimulus
are inseparable from cases in which they are distinct? We have
already seen that the distinct experiences associated with
explicit imagery versus retinal stimulation are linked to activation
of anterior versus posterior regions of visual cortex. We hypoth-
esize that the same cortical dissociation can hold for implicit
imagery. Moreover, for both explicit and implicit forms of
imagery this cortical dissociationwill only occur under conditions
in which the perceptual consequences of stimulus and imagery
are dissociable based on ‘‘content.’’
One content factor that is correlated with the stimulus-imagery
distinction is the strength and quality of evidence for sensation
(see James, 1890). When the stimulus is robust and unambig-
uous, the stimulus is distinctly perceived. Imagery is inconse-
quential (as in Schlack et al. [2008, Soc. Neurosci., abstract],
reviewed above) or irrelevant (drastically improbable, as in
clouds that look like things, or contrived, as in explicit imagery).
When the stimulus is weak, by contrast, stimulus-imagery
confusion may result (as in phantoms). Empirical support for
this view comes originally from a widely cited experiment of
the early 20th century (Perky, 1910) in which human observers
were instructed to imagine specific objects (e.g., a banana)
while viewing a ‘‘blank’’ screen. Unbeknownst to the observers,
very low-contrast (but suprathreshold) images of the same
object were projected on the screen during imagery. Under
these conditions, the perceptual experience was consistently
attributed to imagery—a phenomenon known as the ‘‘Perky
effect’’—observers evinced no awareness of the projected
stimuli, although the properties of those stimuli (e.g., the orienta-
tion of the projected banana) could readily influence the experi-
ence. If the contrast of the projected stimuli were made
sufficiently large, or if subjects were told that projected stimuli
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consistently attributed to the stimulus.
Neurobiological support for the possibility that the stimulus-
imagery distinction is based, in part, on the strength and quality
of evidence for sensation comes from studies of the effects of
electrical microstimulation of cortical visual area MT (Salzman
et al., 1990). This type of stimulation can be thought of as an
artificial form of top-down activation, and the stimulus-imagery
problem applies here as well. Newsome and colleagues have
shown that this activation is confused with sensation, in that it
is added (as revealed by perceptual reports) to the simulta-
neously present retinal stimulus (Salzman et al., 1990). But this
is only true when the stimulus is weak. When the stimulus
is strong, microstimulation has little measurable effect on
behavior.
A related content factor that differentiates cases in which
imagery and stimulus are inseparable from cases in which they
are distinct is the a priori probability of the imagined component.
If the retinal stimulus is weak or ambiguous, some images come
to mind because they are statistically probable features of the
environment, and the stimulus and imaginal contributions are
inseparable. But other images come to mind on a lark or by
a physical resemblance to something seen before (such as the
Rorschach ink blot that looks like a bat). Images of the latter
variety are commonly indifferent to known statistics of the
observer’s environment and they are rarely confused with prop-
erties of that environment received as sensory stimuli. (As with
the old military adage, ‘‘When the terrain differs from the map,
trust the terrain.’’)
Although little is known of the neuronal mechanisms by which
probability influences this process (but see Girshick, Landy and
Simoncelli, 2011), there are well known psychopathologies and
drug-induced alterations of sensory processing in which the
imaginal component dominates regardless of its likelihood or
the quality of stimulation, and perceptual experience becomes
hallucination. By this view, visual hallucinations are a patholog-
ical product of the same top-down system for pictorial recall
that serves perceptual inference—a view supported by the
finding of activity patterns in visual cortex that are correlated
with visual hallucinations in cases of severe psychosis (Oertel
et al., 2007). Moreover, evidence indicates that sensory cortex
is less sensitive to exogenous stimulation during hallucinations
(Kompus et al., 2011), suggesting that the imaginal component
is given a competitive advantage.
A particularly striking pathological case of overreaching imag-
inal influences on perception is Charles Bonnet Syndrome
(CBS)—a bizarre disorder characterized by richly detailed visual
imagery in individuals who have recently lost sight from
pathology to the retina (e.g., macular degeneration) or optic
nerve (Gold and Rabins, 1989). The images perceived are
commonly elicited by associative cues. For example, upon
hearing an account of the revolutionary war, one patient with
CBS reported a vivid percept of a winking sailor: ‘‘He had on
a cap, a blue cap with a polished black beak and he had
a pipe in hismouth’’ (Krulwich, 2008). Similar imagery-dominated
perceptual experiences have been reported for normal human
subjects artificially deprived of vision for extended periods
(Merabet et al., 2004).In all of these cases in which stimulus properties and probabil-
ities, or myriad pathological and pharmacological states, influ-
ence the perceptual distinction between stimulus and imagery,
we can assume that there are patterns of neuronal signaling
correlated with that distinction. Likely candidates are those
brain regions found to be differentially engaged in the neuro-
psychological and fMRI studies of explicit imagery cited
above. Much additional work is needed, however, to identify
the specificmechanisms and neuronal events that underlie these
effects.
Intermodal Associations and Perceptual Experience
This review has focused on vision because it is the sensory
system for which there exists the greatest understanding of
perceptual experience as well as relevant neuronal organization
and function. There are nonetheless good reasons to believe that
the same principles for associative recall and perception pertain
to all senses. Moreover, these principles apply well to interac-
tions between sensory modalities. Perceptual phenomena
reflecting such interactions can be robust and dramatic. To illus-
trate the point, William James (1890) offered the phrase ‘‘Pas de
lieu Rhoˆne que nous,’’ which any Frenchman will tell you makes
no sense at all. If, however, the listener is informed that the
spoken phrase is English, the very same sounds are perceived
as ‘‘paddle your own canoe.’’ James noted further that ‘‘as we
seize the English meaning the sound itself appears to change’’
(my italics).
Along the same lines, Sumby and Pollack (1954) showed that
visibility of a speaker’s lips improves auditory word recognition,
particularly when spokenwords are embedded in auditory noise.
The McGurk Effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976) demon-
strates, furthermore, that moving lips can markedly bias the
interpretation of clearly spoken phonemes. Just as argued for
vision, the visual cue stimulus in such cases elicits associative
auditory recall, which interacts with the bottom-up auditory stim-
ulus. The product is a percept fleshed out by auditory imagery
derived from probabilistic rules. These conclusions are sup-
ported by neurobiological evidence for intermodal associative
recall, which comes from both human brain-imaging studies
(e.g., Calvert et al., 1997; Sathian and Zangaladze, 2002; Zanga-
ladze et al., 1999) and single-cell electrophysiology (e.g., Haenny
et al., 1988; Zhou and Fuster, 2000).
A special case of intermodal interactions, termed ‘‘synes-
thesia,’’ occurs when a stimulus arising in one sensory modality
or submodality (the ‘‘inducer’’) elicits a consistent perceptual
experience (the ‘‘concurrent’’) in another modality. For example,
grapheme-color synesthesia is characterized by the perception
of specific colors upon viewing specific graphical characters
(e.g., the number ‘‘2’’ may elicit a percept of the color blue).
Owing to its intriguing nature, synesthesia has been a subject
of study in psychology and neuroscience for well over 100 years
(Galton, 1880), yet there remains much debate about its etiology.
Evidence suggests a heritable contribution in some cases
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1996), but in other cases the condition
appears dependent upon prior experience (Howells, 1944; Mills
et al., 2002; Ward and Simner, 2003; Witthoft and Winawer,
2006). These experience-based cases argue that synesthetes
have learned associations between stimuli representing theNeuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 239
Figure 7. Hoarfrost at Ennery (Gilee Blanche), Camille Pissarro, Oil
on Canvas, 1873, Muse´e d’Orsay, Paris
Pissarro’s impressionist depiction of frost on a plowed field was the target of
a satirical review by the Parisian art critic Louis Leroy (1874), which questioned
the legitimacy, value, and aesthetics of this new form of art. The impres-
sionists maintained that a few simple and often crudely rendered features
were sufficient to trigger a perceptual experience richly completed by the
observer’s own preposessions. Neuroscientific evidence reviewed herein
suggests that this perceptual completion occurs via the projection of highly-
specific top-down signals into visual cortex. Image used with permission of
Art Resource.
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Perspectiveinducer and concurrent and that subsequent presentation of the
inducer elicits recall of the concurrent. We add to this argument
the hypothesis that the recall event constitutes implicit imagery
of the concurrent, which is mediated by top-down activation of
visual cortex. This appears to be a case in which a learned asso-
ciation is so idiosyncratic that the resulting imaginal contribution
to perception, albeit highly significant, has no inherent value or
adaptive influence over behavior.
Imagery, Categorical Perception, and Perceptual
Learning
Top-down signaling in visual cortex benefits perception by
enabling stimuli to be seen as they are likely to be. One might
easily imagine how this same system could facilitate discrimi-
nation of unfamiliar stimuli by inclining them to be perceived
as familiar stereotypes or caricatures. In his discussion of
perceptual learning—the improved discriminative capacity
that comes with practice—William James (1890) raised this
possibility:
‘‘I went out the other day and found that the snow just
fallen had a very odd look, different from the common
appearance of snow. I presently called it a ‘‘micaceous’’
look; and it seemed to me as if, the moment I did so, the
difference grewmore distinct and fixed than it was before.
The other connotations of the word ‘‘micaceous’’ dragged
the snow farther away from ordinary snow and seemed
even to aggravate the peculiar look in question.’’
What James speaks of is a form of categorical perception, in
which a sensory stimulus (snow, in this example) becomes240 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.bound by association with a large category of stimuli (things
that look like mica) that share unique sensory characteristics.
This phenomenon is a common feature of human perceptual
learning: category concepts or labels can predictably bias judg-
ments of visual similarity (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone
et al., 2001; Gauthier et al., 2003; Yu et al., 2008). All else being
equal, stimuli that are members of the same category are
commonly less discriminable from one another than are
members of different categories. Gauthier et al. (2003) have
argued that the key element is semantic association, as it is
meaning that defines category. While the emphasis on semantic
assignment may be valid, it is arguably true that any sensory-
sensory association is semantic, as the meaning of a sensory
stimulus is given in part by the sensory stimuli with which it is
associated.
Ryu and Albright (2010) explored this sensory association
hypothesis more fully in an attempt to link the perceptual conse-
quences of category learning to existing evidence for top-down
signaling in sensory cortex. These investigators assessed
performance of human observers on a difficult orientation
discrimination task before and after learning of specific visual-
auditory associations. After the initial orientation discrimination
assessment, observers were trained to associate the orienta-
tions individually with one of two very distinct tones: for example,
an orientation of 10 was paired with a tone frequency of 200 Hz
and an orientation of 16 was paired with 1,000 Hz. Orientation
discrimination performance improved markedly following orien-
tation-tone pairing. As for James’ varieties of snow, one can
interpret these findings as resulting from differential category
assignment of the two orientations. The category labels (auditory
tones) in this case are simply symbols that represent the paired
visual orientations.
These effects can be understood mechanistically using the
stimulus-imagery framework described above. This interpreta-
tion begins with the indubitable assumption that the discrimi-
nability of two stimuli is determined, in part, by the degree of
overlap between the patterns of neuronal activity that they elicit
(e.g., Gilbert et al., 2001). The orientation discriminanda used in
these experiments (6 difference) would be expected to activate
highly overlapping distributions of neurons in primary visual
cortex, yielding a difficult discrimination. The findings of Schlack
and Albright (2007) and others (e.g., Zhou and Fuster, 2000),
however, imply that orientation-tone associative learning should
lead to selective top-down activation of cortical neurons repre-
senting the stimuli recalled by association. By this logic, viewing
of each of the orientation discriminanda will not only drive orien-
tation-selective neurons in visual cortex but should also activate
the corresponding frequency-selective neurons in auditory
cortex. If the distributions of recall-related neuronal activity in
auditory cortex are sufficiently distinct (as would be expected
for 200 Hz versus 1,000 Hz tones) those activations may be the
basis for improved discrimination of the visual orientations (rela-
tive to the untrained state). In other words, the improved discrim-
inability of visual orientations ismade possible through the use of
neuronal proxies, which are established by the learned category
labels (tones). This is recognizably the same process that I have
termed implicit imagery, but in this case it serves perceptual
learning.
Figure 8. Demonstration of the Influence of Associative Pictorial
Recall (Top-Down Signaling) on the Interpretation of a Retinal
Stimulus (Bottom-Up Signaling)
Most observers will experience a clear meaningful percept upon viewing this
pattern. After achieving this percept, refer back to Figure 5. The perceptual
interpretation of the pattern should now be markedly different, with a figural
interpretation that is driven largely by imaginal influences drawn from
memory.
Neuron
PerspectiveIt Always Comes Out of Our Own Head
‘‘You see. a hoarfrost on deeply plowed furrows.’’
‘‘Those furrows? That frost? But they are palette-scrap-
ings placed uniformly on a dirty canvas. It has neither head
nor tail, top nor bottom, front nor back.’’
‘‘Perhaps. but the impression is there.’’
This fictional exchange between two 19th century painters
was penned by the Parisian critic Louis Leroy (1874) after viewing
Camille Pissarro’s painting titled Hoarfrost at Ennery (Gilee
Blanche) (Figure 7) at the first major exhibition of impressionist
art (in Paris, 1874). Leroy was not a fan and his goal was satire,
but his critic’s assertion, ‘‘but the impression is there,’’ nonethe-
less captures the essence of the art (and Leroy’s term ‘‘impres-
sionism’’ was, ironically, adopted as the name of themovement).
Indeed, it is precisely what the artist intended, and the art form’s
legitimacy—and ultimately its brilliance—rests on the conviction
that the ‘‘impression’’ (the retinal stimulus) is merely a spark for
associative pictorial recall. The impressionist painter does not
attempt to provide pictorial detail, but rather creates conditions
that enable the viewer to charge the percept, to complete the
picture, based on his/her unique prior experiences. (‘‘The
beholder’s share’’ is what Gombrich [1961] famously and evoc-
atively termed this memory-based contribution to the perception
of art.)
Naturally, both the beauty and the fragility of the method stem
from the fact that different viewers bring different preconcep-
tions and imagery to bear. Leroy’s critic saw only ‘‘palette-
scrapings on a dirty canvas.’’ Legend has it that, upon viewing
a particularly untamed (by the standards of the day) sunset by
the pre-impressionist J.M.W. Turner, a young woman remarked,
‘‘I never saw a sunset like that, Mr. Turner.’’ To which Turner
replied, ‘‘Don’t you wish you could, madam?’’ The undeniable
pleasure that many viewers take in this art form is an example
of what James (1890) termed ‘‘the victorious assimilation of thenew,’’ the coherent perceptual experience of the unknown,
something we have never quite seen before, by its association
with things familiar. The alternative is perceptual rejection of
the new—it bears and elicits nomeaning—leaving the observer’s
(e.g., Leroy’s critic and Turner’s companion) experience mired
in the literal and commonplace world of retinal stimuli.
These knotty concepts of perception, memory, and individual
human experience stand amid a myriad of cognitive factors long
thought to lie beyond the reach of one’s microelectrode. The
recent work reviewed here suggests otherwise, and it identifies
a novel perspective that can now guide the neuroscientific
study of perception forward—ever bearing in mind James’
‘‘general law of perception’’: ‘‘Whilst part of what we perceive
comes through our senses from the object before us, another
part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our
own head’’ (James, 1890).
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